Che Guevara and Guerrilla Warfare: Training for Today's Nonlinear Battlefields

Captain Steve Lewis, US Army

Since the American Revolution, US Armed Forces have been confronted, and sometimes confounded, by low-intensity conflicts (LIC) and unconventional warfare (UW).[1] To protect US interests abroad, US military forces will be called on to conduct insurgency warfare and peacekeeping operations and to provide logistic support in a fluid, nonlinear environment.

Nonlinear battle challenges traditional military roles. Thus, logisticians, not infantrymen defending or destroying a supply convoy, would play a more effective part in seizing a key terrain feature than would conventional forces. This point is clearly made in the 1940 version of the US Marine Corps (USMC) *Small Wars Manual*: "[T]hat small wars are, generally speaking, campaigns rather against nature than against hostile armies . . . constitutes one of the most distinctive characteristics of this class of warfare. [They affect] the course of operations to an extent [that varies] greatly according to circumstances, but so vitally at times as to govern the whole course of the campaign from start to finish. [They] arise almost entirely out of the difficulties as regards supply which the theaters of small wars generally present."[2]

Guevara's "Small War"

Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara formulated his principles of guerrilla warfare from 1956 to 1958 during the revolt against President Fulgencio Batista. The war, which contributed to the fall of Batista's regime, helped install Fidel Castro as *El Presidente*.

Guerrilla warfare principles are part of the Marxist dogma to which many insurgent organizations adhere.[3] Because US forces might face similar situations in the future, it is important for commanders to study such tactics in order to be successful on nonlinear, changing battlefields.

Although not considered a strategic military genius, Guevara's effective, realistic principles served him well. They included mobility, movement by night, careful use of ammunition (supplies), flexibility, careful study of the ground and surprise and fury.[4]

Mobility. "The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility."[5] Mobility is the ability to move vehicles, soldiers and equipment rapidly with relative freedom. Guevara's plan was to strike and move freely, avoiding detection. Mobility complemented surprise and flexibility. The guerrillas did not become comfortable or get tied to certain areas. They had to stay one step ahead of government forces. Their mobility put a constant strain on government forces, which had to spread their assets thin.

Mobility allows US forces to keep a potential enemy guessing in the same way. The US usually has an advantage in mobility since its industrial edge allows deployment of all necessary materiel. The ability to establish logistic resupply points (LRPs) at any place and time helps prevent ambushes or traps.

Developing mobility in small units within a support battalion requires the development of circumstances and attitude to ensure each soldier and vehicle has the proper tools to operate in any area at any time. This means having several days worth of food and water for each soldier and equipment and supplies needed for communication, minor repairs, signaling and first aid. Many innovative ideas are currently being explored to increase every unit's mobility and safety.

Comprehensive training geared to developing confidence and initiative develops a person's attitude. To maintain mobility, land-navigation training is critical. Key leaders need to know the unit's mission and what each person's role will be. Well-conducted rehearsals develop soldiers' confidence and encourage planning for the unexpected. For example, no vehicle should stop without knowing where it will go next. If that decision depends on circumstances, the leader must know those circumstances and why he should or should not bypass an LRP.

Movement by night. Movement by night, another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, includes road marches, convoys, reconnaissance, emplacement of operational bases, resupply activities, rehearsals and attacks. Guevara believed his guerrillas knew the ground better than did government forces. Therefore, they would have more success while operating at night against government forces whose "garrison attitude" kept them safely indoors during the night. Guerrillas were free to move forces, conduct surveillance, attack with surprise then withdraw into the night, contributing to the impression that they were everywhere and could attack at any time.

In conventional operations, night operations are a strong component of force protection for the parent unit and for the group conducting the operation. Departing from a brigade support area (BSA) at night limits the enemy's knowledge of what supplies are loaded. If the enemy sees three palletized-load system trucks carrying 120-millimeter tank rounds leaving the BSA quickly, heading toward a certain task force's area of oper-

ations, it might be a tip-off that someone is short of ammunition. Weapons training also should be conducted at night, if possible, to take advantage of the cover darkness provides.

Careful Use of Ammunition (Supplies). "[T]he care which must be taken of ammunition and the method of using it are further characteristics of guerrilla warfare."[6] All armies have restrictions on available supplies, the care and management of which can contribute significantly to any operation's outcome. For example, wasteful movement of unneeded supplies can detract from a battle in the same way as can the absence of needed supplies. Supply bases or depots are also high-payoff targets.

Ammunition was Guevara's most critical supply item. It was only available from government forces, and it was quickly expended. Food, clothing and shelter were available from the local population, and weapons, taken from the government or guerrilla dead, had long, useful lives if properly maintained. But only small amounts of ammunition were available. Guevara trained his soldiers to fire only at certain targets and to never waste ammunition. Fire discipline and marksmanship were critical.

Ammunition is no less important. As one of the most industrialized nations on earth, the United States has an absolute advantage in available supplies. The ability to move a large amount of supplies rapidly is a key strength. However, there is needless waste of military assets, which causes support soldiers to expend unnecessary time and energy and places them in unnecessary danger if they must resupply a unit that could not forecast or manage its resources properly.

That the US Army is so powerful and fast compromises the logistic chain. The farther combat vehicles and troops move from their sources of supplies, the more resources are required to resupply them. Therefore, timely resupply from the forward supply brigade is critical. For example, a tank stationed at a road intersection still consumes fuel even while stationary because it must continue to run its engine to keep its battery charged. If the tank's wing-man is 10 kilometers away, the battalion's support platoon must drive farther distances more frequently to resupply both. In turn, the support platoon is exposed to greater risk and must be protected and resupplied as well.

Flexibility. "Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt himself to all circumstances and to convert to his service all the accidents of the actions."[7] Flexibility is the ability to adapt to changing circumstances to take advantage of change. Guerrilla armies are usually forced to limit their operations to targets of opportunity early in their campaigns. This requires flexibility and the ability to take advantage of an unguarded government asset or military target.

No operation ever goes as planned, and the skill and wisdom to recognize changing circumstance can change defeat into victory. However, the ability to do this is only present if there is decentralized control and if initiative is encouraged at every level. The higher up the chain of command that information must travel before a decision can be made decreases exponentially the time available to use the information.

To maintain and employ flexibility, US forces must have the proper equipment and training to allow them to seize the initiative and take advantage of changing circumstances. Properly equipped vehicles enable soldiers to maintain contact with higher headquarters and monitor ongoing operations.

Flexibility is further developed through training soldiers to use their mental tools to maximize their physical tools. The ability to call for fire and close air support as well as to coordinate with other units must be taught to every noncommissioned officer (NCO).

Initiative is the most important tool that can be taught and nurtured. A commander, platoon leader or section sergeant must underwrite subordinates' honest mistakes. Soldiers must really believe their boss wants them to seize an opportunity. A battalion commander must ensure his soldiers know he believes in their ability to adjust to a changing environment. A battalion commander who believes in only centralized control could find that his elements are dead or lost and his vehicles out of fuel and ammunition.

Careful Study of the Ground. "[G]uerrilla-defended positions, when they have been selected on the basis of a careful study of the ground, are invulnerable."[8] The value of reconnaissance and preparation, map reconnaissance, terrain walks, rehearsals, familiarity with the patterns of the enemy and the local population and a relationship with the local population cannot be overstated. Guerrilla forces usually are familiar with the people and the terrain in which they operate.

The most useful aspect of a study of the ground is recognizing patterns. Most large organizations, especially military organizations, fall into patterns of conduct. Convoys leave and arrive; guards change shifts; and units receive supplies. Patterns can tell how long it takes a unit to react to an enemy attack and what weapons it will use. Guevara's guerrillas' familiarity with the area allowed them to always have the most reliable information.[9]

US forces must recognize that there is more to the ground than just dirt. During an LIC, they must remember that the local population will be close. They must know who lives in the area of operations, what their politics are, whether they are primarily urban or agrarian and whether operations are aiding or hindering them in their daily lives. Soldiers will be interacting closely with the local populace, so training must go beyond learning to yell "stay away from the wire."

Surprise and Fury. "The form of attack of a guerrilla army is also different; starting with surprise and fury, irresistible, it suddenly converts itself into total passivity."[10] Surprise is doing the unexpected and doing it rapidly—an action that gives no indication or warning when it begins or when it will end. However, surprise cannot be accomplished without mobility and flexibility. Also, movement at night increases flexibility and contributes to surprise.

Even with limited resources and personnel, Guevara insisted on maintaining the edge of surprise. Attacking government forces when they did not expect it was the only way to maximize limited resources. A critical part of his plan was to keep government forces guessing where he would strike next, forcing them to spread their resources thin to cover all, or the most probable, targets.

US forces can keep adversaries off balance by not establishing patterns. Units that establish routines that can be "read" by the enemy can fall victim to surprise attacks. In the mid-1990s, US Army Rangers in Somalia established a dangerous pattern by taking down buildings, thought to contain Somali warlords, in the same way every time. After seeing the US military continuously use the same tactics, the Somalis laid a successful ambush. Somali Colonel Ali Aden said, "If you use a tactic twice, you should not use it a third time."[11]

In 1999, a successful use of surprise occurred at the National Training Center in Utah. The opposing force (OPFOR) set a pattern of attacking the BSA with mortars about the same time every day. Their location was never the same, but their target was usually fuel tankers. The commander deduced the pattern and the next likely area from which the OPFOR would attack. He was right, and his troops destroyed the OPFOR mortar team.[12]

Learning by Example

Leaders can apply Guevara's principles to the ever-changing LIC/UW environment, which has several distinctive characteristics, as the following examples illustrate.

No front lines and no clearly defined battlespace, enemy areas or safe areas. An LIC is not limited to the linear battle; the enemy might come from all sides. Therefore, it is unlikely that the conflict will have defined enemy areas or safe areas. The danger to convoys or supply areas will be just as great as or greater than to infantry soldiers. With no organized uniformed army to defeat or terrain to hold, battles will be ones of individual initiative.

During the Afghanistan guerrilla war to repel the Soviet Army, the *Mujahidin*—Afghan rebels—roamed the countryside. They would choose an ambush site, destroy a convoy then disappear, forcing the Soviets to deploy more soldiers and armored vehicles on every convoy.[13]

Close proximity to local population. In an urban environment or countryside, the area of operations is usually tied to the civilian population. Protecting one civilian group from another requires a close relationship with the protected group. The mission will not be to defeat an enemy's standing army but to maintain peace between two ethnic groups or to support a newly democratic government. Proximity to civilians might also affect logistics, since many receiving and distribution centers will be located in heavily populated areas and might employ local citizens.[14]

Specialized supply requirements. Individual water sources, fresh food, automotive parts, humanitarian-aid items, nonlethal weapons and infrastructure supplies are all nonstandard supply items that might be needed in a low-intensity conflict. A smaller quantity of these items, relative to a conventional war, will be needed over an area far wider than on a conventional battlefield. The US Army discovered this while conducting military operations in urban terrain training. Special ladders and other climbing aids, as well as forced-entry tools, were required.[15]

Specialized requirements for building democracy, such as food, voting equipment and public address systems, might also be needed.[16] The USMC *Small Wars Manual* states, "In most small war situations, almost every accepted principle of warfare on a large scale is subject to modification due to the irregularity of the operation. It is this characteristic that sets the 'small war' in a class by itself. It is obvious then, that a successful supply plan in any small war theater must be ready to meet these irregular conditions."[17]

Greater requirement for individual or small-unit operations. During LICs, combat units are broken into smaller groups and spread over the width and depth of the area of operations. This altered battlespace requires a flexible, fluid supply-distribution channel because if combat units are not massed in small areas, conventional supply-distribution systems will not work. Support soldiers will have to travel longer distances to resupply the widespread combat units.

In the former Yugoslavia, US forces are currently confronting this problem. Since their mission is peacekeeping, forces are spread over a large area for maximum visibility, which creates considerable supply challenges.[18] Creation of flexible supply teams is needed to meet these new demands.

Decrease in US ability to optimize mass or use heavy weapons. US industrial power might not be used because of political constraints or it might be ineffective. For example, tanks that can destroy targets at 2,500 meters might be used as roadblocks, or bombers that can deliver tons of ordnance might not be used at all. Consider the following examples of ineffective firepower.

During France's attempt to defeat the Vietnamese communists from 1946 to 1954, they made considerable use of heavy artillery. However, they were surprised to discover that artillery had little effect on Vietnamese guerrillas. The Viet Minh—the predecessors of the Viet Cong—took cover until artillery barrages ceased then continued their attack. The Viet Minh also "hugged" French bases, keeping too close for the French to call in effective fire. The French also discovered that close air support was largely ineffective against the guerrillas.[19]

In another example, British soldier T.E. Lawrence directed Arab guerrilla warriors to avoid open battles with the Turks because the Turks outgunned them. He opted for attacks on supply and troop trains—areas where heavy firepower was absent.[20]

These examples reveal firepower limitations that could affect US logisticians' abilities to operate in an LIC area. With no heavy or effective firepower, guerrilla fighters might be more willing to risk confrontation, especially with less well-armed logistics soldiers.

Inability to distinguish friend from foe. Guerrilla fighters are civilians. If they are not carrying weapons, they are almost impossible to identify as adversaries. Civilians who are not guerrillas might be passing information to the enemy or to US forces. Each person will have loyalties, and some people will change loyalties daily.

The Russian occupation of Afghanistan provides many examples of "trusted" Afghan citizens committing acts of sabotage against the Soviets. In one instance, a Soviet officer's driver helped Afghan rebels kidnap the Soviet officer. In another, an Afghan employee at the communist party headquarters planted a bomb. After the explosion, and not being a suspect, she got a new job at Kabul University where she planted another bomb. Both bombs caused considerable damage and loss of life.[21]

An increase of nonaligned players. Apart from civilian populations, there are a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGO), government organizations from neutral countries, national and international businesses and religious organizations whose interests might be for, against or neutral to US interests.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, currently lists 70 NGOs operating in Kosovo alone.[22] While such organizations are for humanitarian reasons, how many could harbor a sniper or saboteur? How many might relay information about US forces if they felt it would further their interests? Also, simply conferring with representatives of extreme political organizations can sometimes lend them a legitimacy that could be detrimental to US interests.[23]

Changes in the military decisionmaking process and battle rhythm. Conventional US warriors are accustomed to a well-established planning and execution cycle known as battle rhythm. A brigade battle rhythm for a major operation is 32 hours for planning and preparation and 21 hours for execution.[24] At the NTC, the battle rhythm is one preparation day and one battle day, then the cycle repeats. In an LIC, many smaller operations might be required, each with varying time lines.[25] Therefore, the schedule that unit leaders have trained to throughout their careers might not apply.

The availability and use of advanced technology. Geographic positioning systems (GPS), night-vision goggles (NVGs), weapons, cellular phones and GPS jammers are available to anyone for relatively low prices and can be purchased from a military surplus catalog.[26] This availability of high-tech weapons presents a serious threat. Guerrilla armies might not be able to afford a tank, but they might be able to afford plastic explosives, NVGs and various small arms.

In a 1999 *Army Times* article, Colonel John Rosenberger, the NTC OPFOR commander, describes available technology: "For $40,000 I can go buy a GPS jammer from Russia. They put it on the market two months ago. It's an 8-watt jammer that will take down both [commonly used GPS] frequencies for about 200 to 250 miles. Well, that levels the playing field. . . . [S]houldn't we be training against the forces that create a loss of GPS capability? You bet."[27]

Training's Importance

A conventional army cannot be thrust into an LIC/UW environment without training or preparation. A UW environment is just that—unconventional. If soldiers are not trained or allowed to think for themselves, the US Armed Forces will lose. There are limited resources abroad and limited amounts of training time. Therefore, the US military must determine the correct training needed for tomorrow's battles and focus on it.

The military can prepare for changes in the plan, but the only way it can really prepare for unconventional war is to teach soldiers to take the initiative. Leaders must ensure that NCOs receive the proper resources and the confidence that they will be trusted with important missions.

US President John F. Kennedy said that unconventional warfare "is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. . . . [I]t requires in those situations where we must counter it . . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."[28] Kennedy's statement shows remarkable insight into the battles of the future. ***MR***

NOTES

1. John Ellis, *From the Barrel of a Gun* (Conshohocken, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995), 64. Although many conventional battles occurred during the Revolutionary War, those in North and South Carolina, especially, were considered guerrilla warfare.
2. US Marine Corps (USMC), *Small Arms Manual* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), 1940), 13, sec 3-17.
3. Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).
4. Ibid., 58-61.
5. Ibid., 58.
6. Ibid., 60.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 61.
9. Ibid., 115.
10. Ibid., 61.
11. Daniel Bolger, *Battle for Hunger Hill* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 167.
12. NTC Rotation 99-06, *Combat Service Support After Action Review* (April 1999).
13. MG Oleg Sarin and COL Lev Dvoretsky, *The Afghan Syndrome* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 97.
14. LTG William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 107.
15. Robert Hahn and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025," *Parameters* (Summer 1999), 74-86.
16. US Army, Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTP), Volume 1, "Bosnia-Herzegovina National Elections," *CALL Newsletter 98-18* (1998), <www.call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/98-18/98-18toc.htm>.
17. USMC, 7, sec 3-5.
18. US Army, "Drawing a Line in the Mud," *CALL Newsletter 96-5* (1996), <www.call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/96-5/sec3zos.htm>.
19. Robert Scales, *Firepower in Limited War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 33.
20. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York: Doubleday, 1926), 194.
21. Ali Jalai and Lester Grau, "Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas," *Infantry* (January-April 1999).
22. US Army, <http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/ngos/organizations.html>.
23. P.T. Simmons, "Learning to Live with NGOs," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1998), 83.
24. Bolger, 206.
25. NTC AAR.
26. US Army, *US Cavalry Equipment Catalog*, 1999.
27. Sean Naylor, "Combat Training Just Got Tougher," *Army Times* (27 December 1999), 15.
28. John F. Kennedy as quoted in US Army Field Manual 90-8, *Counter Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), iv.

Captain Steve Lewis received his B.S. from Arizona State University and is a recent graduate of the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, Fort Lee, Virginia. He has served in various platoon and company positions in the Continental United States. Anyone who wants to correspond with Lewis regarding this article can E-mail him at <stevel214@earthlink.net>.

Functional Alignment of Army Branches: A Key for Change

Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Anderson, US Army

In June 1999, shortly after his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki said his goal was "to provide strategic leadership [to] keep the Army the preeminent land warfighting force in the world."[1] He postulated six objectives:

- Increase strategic responsiveness.
- Develop a clear long-term strategy to improve operational joint readiness and to implement Joint Vision 2010 goals.
- Develop leaders for joint warfighting.
- Complete the full integration of Active (AC) and Reserve Components (RC).
- Fill all warfighting units.
- Provide for the well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members.[2]

Shinseki then set the azimuth for a more deployable, lethal force that would be properly manned and equipped to accomplish US national military strategy. Given the continuous and growing gap between funding and military requirements, this task would require looking hard at competing programs and capabilities and making difficult decisions on the nature of traditional Army roles and capabilities.

Fight to Win or Adapt to Win?

The Army's ultimate business is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, it is currently involved in many activities that do not match traditional roles. In 1997, Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. White, addressing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Board, said, "We are at a pivotal point in history where the Cold War recedes in the past and a new century rushes toward us."[3] The QDR challenges the Army to develop new strategy and capabilities for an era that will have fewer resources. According to White, this effort would involve some "hellish" choices and the only sacred cow is a strong defense.[4] To realize his vision and set the Army's fiscal course, Shinseki will have to make these hellish choices.

In *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* Ralph Peters suggests there is a fundamental asymmetry between the kind of military force we have and the kind we need.[5] Peters' underlying theme is that we are "preparing for the war we want to fight . . . not the conflicts we cannot avoid."[6] Clearly, Shinseki is taking steps to avoid this trap and is trying to bring strategic relevance and balance to the Army without risking the nation's peace and prosperity.

Changes in force structure and traditional roles are inevitable. Inherent parochialism and branch pride will be the most challenging hurdle to negotiate as the Army moves toward becoming a strategic force. As the Army modifies force structure and creates a doctrine tailored for tomorrow's conflicts, it must assess current branches and their contribution to warfighting.

On 22 April 1898, Congress provided that "the organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the Army of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into service of the United States."[7] AC and RC organization and functions have evolved over time to meet the tasks required for "prompt and sustained operations on land."[8]

After World War II the Army's roles and missions were to defeat enemy land forces, seize and occupy terrain, defend land areas, shoot down aircraft, conduct amphibious and airborne operations, provide intelligence and sustain itself over long periods of time.[9] Indeed, the Army has met a range of challenges with competent, confident soldiers trained to perform specific functions that contributed to overall combat effectiveness.

Over time, functions and associated technology generated unique skills and competencies that gave birth to the various branches. The branches became platform-centric, gaining autonomy and specificity in warfighting. Current and forecasted threats, service roles and missions and technology influenced branch perpetuity and relevance, which led to plump budgets for operations and maintenance and future systems. Branch success was measured by the new weapon system on the horizon or an improved budget. Army branch traditions were on the brink of becoming impediments to efficiently linking resources (means) to how we intend to fight (ways). Slight changes in warfighting, training and maintenance are closely scrutinized for a change in branch structure, which could lead to a failure in branch relevance.

A Common Platform

If the Army adopts a common platform, the only significant difference will be the weapons and fire control systems used. A common platform eases maintenance and streamlines training and supply. Just imagine the military occupation skills and officer branches of Infantry and Armor merging to form one branch—maneuver—to groom officers to lead combined arms and mission-tailored battalions and brigades to accomplish the traditional maneuver functions of seizing and holding terrain and closing with and destroying the enemy.

Deep and close fires are coordinated and executed by the strike branch—an amalgamation of the current attack helicopter and artillery branch. Strike officers command units that shape the battlefield through interdiction by lethal and nonlethal means. Strike and maneuver packages are tailored for contingencies ranging from peacekeeping to a major theater war and can easily function as a force package for a joint task force (JTF). Maneuver and strike branches see battlespace in real time achieving information dominance, thereby providing opportunities for commanders to mass the effects of combat power vice massing personnel and equipment.

The branch or function that will significantly contribute to achieving information dominance is the information operations branch, which would combine signal and intelligence functions. Transmitting and receiving information through various media and interpreting and analyzing information is the information operations branch's core responsibility. It also provides red and blue arrays and terrain and weather information in support of maneuver and strike functions.

The ability to sustain a tailored formation for a specific mission is the responsibility of the sustainment branch, which incorporates all current personnel, maintenance, transportation, quartermaster, contractor and ordnance functions, and tailors logistic and transportation packages by shifting and tracking assets to support contingencies. This branch also fuses host-nation, nongovernmental organizations and allied contributions.

The force's multilayered, full-dimensional protection is the force-protection branch's responsibility. It combines air defense, chemical, military police and engineer branches. The force protection branch protects forces and facilities from attack while maintaining freedom of maneuver during deployment, employment and redeployment and provides active and passive defense measures to protect the force as well as the assets to ensure operational and tactical mobility.

From 13 to 5

An amalgamation of the 13 Army branches into five functional components opens constructive dialogue regarding the Army's warfighting formations: corps, divisions and brigades. From the five functional components, formations can be tailored and sustained for worldwide contingencies. The building-block approach to force packages could streamline overhead, such as headquarters, personnel and maintenance support. Most important, the Army functional alignment would further the formation of capabilities-based JTFs.

From a training perspective, the numerous schools also could be reduced to five. For example, Fort Knox, Kentucky, could become the maneuver center; Fort Bliss, Texas, would become the force-protection operational area. An officer's professional growth in each functional area would provide the Army a diverse officer corps for use in a wide range of positions.

The possibilities are endless when branches are combined and aligned functionally. Having purple-suit branches that serve all services might serve as an effective, yet cost-avoiding initiative. Legal and medical branches are prime candidates. Centralizing legal and medical functions across all services would ensure that these low-density, high-demand skills are best aligned with the needs of the military versus the needs of one service. Also, centralized training and modernization would benefit the military force.

If the military is successful in this endeavor, the signal and military intelligence branches also would be considered as a purple-suit functional area. The most logical benefit would be ensuring a common command and control (C^2) architecture with supporting functional inputs from maneuver, strike, force protection, information operations and sustainment. Battle management, C^2, "red" force and terrain and weather analyses would be streamlined when all signal and intelligence leaders are educated and trained from one source and exposed to the same hardware and software tailored for specific service mission areas. A common, relevant air, ground and sea picture would enhance the effective and efficient use of all service capability in accomplishing campaign objectives.

Functional alignment would reduce parochialism and enhance change in force structure and how the force intends to fight. Traditional branch insignia could be replaced with an insignia exemplifying that each person is a soldier first, trained and equipped to perform a range of functions across the spectrum of conflict.

In light of projected threats, the international and domestic environment and the missions that can be expected, change is on the horizon. All services are adjusting traditional roles by expanding capabilities whether forward from the sea or from space. The race to be more relevant has begun. So, the more capabilities-based the Army becomes, the more relevant it will be in this world of uncertainty. ***MR***

NOTES

1. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, "Beginning the Next 100 Years," *Army* (October 1999).
2. Ibid., 28.
3. Earl H. Tilford Jr., "National Defense Into the 21st Century: Defining Issues," *Strategic Studies Institute Special Report* (6 June 1997), 8.
4. Ibid., 16.
5. Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).
6. Ibid., 22.
7. US Army, *The Army Almanac* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), 35.
8. Ibid., 38.
9. Ibid.

Colonel Charles A. Anderson, US Army, is brigade commander, 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. from Indiana University and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. He has served in various Army command and staff positions.

Engagement Force: A Solution to the Readiness Dilemma

Colonel Timothy D. Cherry, US Army

The military has an important role in engagement–helping to shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more peaceful and stable world. The purpose of our Armed Forces, however, is to deter and defeat threats of organized violence to our country and its interests. While fighting and winning two near simultaneous wars remains the foremost task, we must also respond to a wide variety of other potential crises.

— GEN John M. Shalikashvili[1]

The Soviet Union's sudden collapse sent many analysts scrambling to come up with new post-Cold War security assessments and strategies. While there was no consensus as to the greatest threat facing US interests, it was evident the US must become a leader in promoting peace and preventing regional conflict.

One new concept that emerged was engagement, which shapes the international environment by promoting regional stability and the peaceful resolution of problems. A recent National Security Strategy document states, "Today's complex security environment demands that all of our instruments of national power be effectively integrated to achieve our security objectives. . . . American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our security, and our nation and the world are safer and more prosperous as a result."[2]

The new concept led to a revised national military strategy that centered on the terms *Shape, Respond* and *Prepare Now*. General John M. Shalikashvili says, "The National Military Strategy is based on these concepts. It builds on the premise that the United States will remain globally engaged to *Shape* the international environment and create conditions favorable to US interests and global security. It emphasizes that our Armed Forces must *Respond* to the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our national interests. It further states that as we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to *Prepare Now* for an uncertain future."[3]

As the Army struggled with promulgating and implementing the new engagement strategy, it was also completing a major downsizing initiative slated to reduce the active Army by 300,000 (from 795,000 to 495,000) and the number of divisions from 18 to 10. What, in effect, happened was the introduction of a new engagement strategy that required increased operational force deployments, but with less force structure with which to execute the new strategy.

Ironically, "the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) in 1993 based its operational requirements on fielding forces sufficient to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) and to provide overseas presence. In determining force requirements, the BUR assumed small-scale contingencies (SSCs) could be handled as lesser cases by forces earmarked for MRCs, without any negative effect on their capabilities for the primary mission. Since 1989, however, the number of small-scale conflicts, humanitarian emergencies and other similar contingencies has grown from 16 during the Cold War period to 45 from 1989 to 1997."[4] Army leaders did not foresee the Army's increased participation in, and the long duration of, SSCs and the resultant high operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Nor did they foresee their impact on Army readiness.

The Army determined that general-purpose forces would be used to accomplish engagement activities and fight major theater wars (MTWs). According to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), "US forces must be multimission capable and . . . able to transition to fighting [MTWs] from a posture of global engagement—that is, from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller scale contingencies."[5] However, the Army is structured for warfighting—not SSCs—and must tailor forces substantially for most contingency operations.

Because Army forces train predominately on conventional warfighting tasks, units identified for most contingency operations require specialized training before deployment. Predictably, while units train for and execute SSCs, warfighting skills atrophy and combat proficiency declines. More important, while units are caught in the cycle of preparing for, executing and recovering from SSCs, they are essentially unavailable for MTWs. This recent phenomenon threatens the Army's ability to successfully accomplish its primary mission—fighting and winning two near simultaneous MTWs.

At the center of the Army's readiness dilemma is the mismatch between current mission requirements and forces available. Clearly, General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the US Army, recognizes the Army's readiness and engagement challenges, as evidenced by his recent mandate to fill divisions to 100 percent strength and to stand-up two experimental transformation brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, specifically designed for SSCs.

The Army is headed in the right direction. However, these initiatives alone will only slow the downward-readiness trend, not reverse it. Recent congressional interest and the upcoming QDR process offer a window of opportunity for the Army to present a viable solution to the readiness dilemma.

Decline in Warfighting Readiness

Before the Gulf War, Army warfighting units (divisions, brigades and battalions) focused primarily on fighting and winning the nation's wars. Reasonable predictability enabled units to conduct long-range planning and implement Cold-War training doctrine.

Four to eight months before the start of the fiscal year, divisions, brigades and battalions produced annual command training guidance with attached training calendars. Quarterly training briefings, which focused on warfighting mission essential task list (METL) assessments, were conducted 30 days before each quarter. Quarterly training plans, designed to improve METL proficiency, were reviewed, modified and eventually became contracts that higher-level commanders approved.

For the most part, units were directed and resourced to conduct required annual external evaluations at battalion and company levels. Maneuver brigades and battalions trained extensively before combat training center (CTC) rotations, and performances reflected this training. Clear mission focus and frequent training events at each echelon enabled units to sustain mission proficiency and remain within the prescribed band of excellence. The Army entered Operation *Desert Storm* as the finest trained force ever fielded by the United States. Its performance in combat validated Army training doctrine.

Because their training was adequately resourced, units achieved a remarkable state of combat readiness. They focused on their warfighting mission and planned and executed their training schedules with reasonable predictability. Unfortunately, this is not now the case. Shortly after the Gulf War ended, the US government cashed in its Cold War peace dividend by reducing force structure and defense budgets. Coping with reduction in forces and concurrent increases in OPTEMPO, units are finding it more difficult to follow the Army's training doctrine.

The Army's combat training centers include the Battle Command Training Program, the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). These training centers provide the best training a unit can experience short of actual combat. At the core of all training centers is a highly trained cadre of observers and controllers (O/Cs), a professional and competent opposing force (OPFOR) and a state-of-the-art instrumentation system that can replay what actually happened during each simulated battle. It comes as no surprise that combat training centers are widely credited for the Army's superb performance during *Desert Storm*.

Unit performance during training-center rotations remains the key measure of warfighting proficiency in the active Army. Unfortunately, recent reports coming out of combat training centers highlight the Army's declining readiness posture.

In early 1999, the Army inspector general told senior leaders that "entry-level performance at the combat training centers continues to decline."[6] He cited lack of resources, absent leaders, OPTEMPO, personnel turbulence and defused mission focus as predominate reasons for the decline. According to NTC leaders, declining training budgets year after year, coupled with the demand of noncombat missions overseas, have left combat arms units less trained. "Leaders [at NTC] are unanimous in their view that units are arriving at a much lower entry level than they were just a few years ago."[7]

Negative Impact

The negative impact of the lack of training is noticed at all levels. A mechanized infantry platoon sergeant with 12 training center rotations noticed the difference between previous and current rotations: "[In the past,] we'd spend almost six months training up. Once we got [to NTC], we were ready to go."[8]

The erosion of basic warfighting skills is the most obvious indicator of less-frequent training. According to a former O/C and OPFOR commander, there is an absence of fundamental skills and abilities at every level. Many believe the only solution to the problem is to increase the frequency of training.[9] One of the primary reasons units are showing up at CTCs less trained is the adverse impact of SSCs on the active Army.

SSCs' most obvious impact on the Army is the decline in warfighting proficiency of units earmarked for SSC operations. According to the Department of Defense, the greatest impact of participation in an SSC operation comes from removing a unit from its normal training cycle. Units require repetitive, cyclical collective-training events using maneuver areas, gunnery ranges and simulations in order to maintain combat capability.[10] "Combat arms units (Infantry, Armor, Artillery) that are heavily equipment-dependent face the greatest combat skill erosion when they participate in a peace operation, particularly when they participate without their equipment and perform tasks that are significantly different than the combat tasks to which they train."[11] A recent Congressional Budget Office study on the effects of peace operations found that "Army units have shown a clear drop in their training readiness for conventional war after taking part in peace operations."[12]

Recently, the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to Bosnia to conduct peacekeeping duty for one year and did not expect to reestablish and test required high-intensity warfighting skills until March 2000–five months after returning from Bosnia. Thus, one of the Army's premier heavy divisions expected to be affected for nearly two years by its participation in the Bosnia mission and would not be immediately deployable for wartime tasking.[13]

Further complicating the readiness issue are the second- and third-order effects on other units. According to a recent Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) study, sustained SSC operations affect up to three times the actual deployed troop strength. Replacement units usually require from two to six months advance notice for train-up. Once notified, these units normally stop warfighting training to focus on the SSC mission. Once they are pulled out of the conventional training cycle, warfighting readiness begins to erode and continues to decline until the unit returns from the SSC mission. Units returning from SSC operations face decreased readiness for up to six months the length of time it took to recover and reenter the normal warfighting training cycle. So, for each ongoing SSC, there might be up to three times the number of soldiers and units at various states of warfighting readiness and not readily available for participation in an MTW.[14]

SSC deployments also adversely affect stay-behind units. They might

have detached a slice to support the SSC operation or provided fillers to bring the deployed unit up to strength. This could have a minor effect, if just a few soldiers are involved, or a major effect, if subordinate units deploy and the unit can no longer accomplish its wartime tasks.

Stay-behind units also frequently loan vehicles and equipment to the deploying force, and soldiers in units staying at home station must conduct garrison support more frequently, further reducing sustainment-training opportunities. Under the surface, peace operations can significantly affect short-notice deployability and readiness of many other units.[15]

General-Purpose versus Specialized Forces

The 1997 QDR states, "US forces must be multimission-capable, and they must be organized, trained, equipped and managed with multiple missions in mind."[16] The Army's rationale is that peace operations—SSCs—should not detract from a unit's warfighting focus or readiness. On the other hand, the Army recognizes that a significant number of tasks might be different from a unit's wartime METL and that specialized training might be required depending on the particular mission. In these cases, the Army's training philosophy for peace operations is "just enough and just in time."[17]

Units earmarked for SSC missions are normally untrained on most SSC tasks and require extensive training and certification before deployment. Unfortunately, in some cases the mission will not wait, and units are required to deploy so quickly they receive virtually no specialized SSC training. This brings into question the ability of those units to effectively accomplish their missions. The difficulty of force tailoring and the complexity of SSCs have challenged the Army's use of general-purpose forces for SSCs.

As the number of peace operations has increased, so has the complexity of these operations. The nature of today's SSC operations is quite different from conventional warfighting. According to Lawrence A. Yates, "The OOTW [operations other than war] battlefield is more likely to be characterized by the nonlinear disposition of troops, the absence of a clearly defined . . . enemy and the presence of noncombatants. The preferred responses to the challenges presented generally fall within the realm of diplomacy, not combat."[18]

Today's peace operations are likely to include tasks such as supervising elections, protecting specified safe areas, interacting extensively with local people, guarding surrendered weapons, ensuring the safe delivery of supplies and rebuilding government agencies or police forces.[19]

Many tasks are much different from those normally associated with conventional warfare, particularly for combat arms units. The fundamental differences between most warfighting and SSC operations are the divergent tasks associated with each. The former requires destruction and killing, the latter requires peace and diplomacy.

In the past, it was generally believed combat units could sustain proficiency on both types of tasks. Recent experience proves otherwise. Therefore, since it is widely accepted that most combat arms units cannot sustain a high level of readiness on both warfighting and SSC tasks, it follows that without specially trained forces available, the Army must accept risk on short-notice SSC operations. One example occurred in 1992. The 10th Mountain Division (Light) (MD(L)) received less than three weeks' notice before deploying to Somalia and spent most of that time executing deployment standard operating procedures (SOPs).[20]

It is difficult to assess the effect that receiving or not receiving peace-operations training can have on a unit's ability to perform its mission. Many factors are involved, including the nature of the operation and the unit's experience. Also, measures of success for a peace operation are not easily identified. Still, "virtually every nontraditional operation case study involving combat units is replete with a litany of complaints that the troops were not prepared or trained to perform many of the noncombat tasks assigned to them. Such tasks included distributing food, manning checkpoints, collecting money for weapons, quelling civil disturbances, reassuring local inhabitants, negotiating with civic leaders, arbitrating between contending factions and rebuilding infrastructure. The 'warrior' mind-set so essential to combat can be the source of anger, confusion, frustration and failure when applied to OOTW operations."[21]

Another change in SSC operations is the introduction of a number of nonlethal systems to help reduce civilian casualties, avoid unnecessary property damage and help protect US personnel.[22] Nonlethal weapons present unique legal concerns and require different rules of engagement (ROE) than Army forces traditionally use. Some systems include sticky foam, aqueous foam, road spikes, stinger grenades, CS grenades and a number of nonlethal munitions (rubber pellet cartridges, bean bag rounds, rubber bullets and wooden baton rounds).[23] This rapidly developing nonlethal system technology requires new doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and will make future SSC training even more complex.

The Army has also been challenged with providing the right kinds of forces for both SSC operations and MTWs. The Army's current Cold-War force structure is designed to accomplish its most challenging mission—to fight and win in two MTWs. Forces well designed for that mission are normally not as well designed for SSC operations, even though such operations are seen as less difficult.[24] During Operation *Joint Guard* in Bosnia and Task Force *Able Sentry* in Macedonia, mechanized infantry, armor and cavalry units left their organic tanks and Bradley's behind and operated in Up-Armored wheeled vehicles and lightly armored personnel carriers.

Most combat arms units require extensive force tailoring before conducting SSC operations, which predictably affects their ability to rapidly form and deploy. Predictably, once engaged in an SSC operation, disengagement in the event of an MTW would be at best extremely challenging to execute. Some of the required units for SSC operations include military police, civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP), engineer, transportation, quartermaster, water

purification, signal and military intelligence (MI). These combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units are in high demand for SSC operations and incur a disproportionate share of the Army's increasing OPTEMPO. Many of these units are in Reserve Components (RC) rather than the active Army, which further exacerbates the problem.

Some military and civilian leaders have raised concern about the high deployment rate and OPTEMPO of low-density units and the deleterious effect on morale and retention.[25] Specially organized engagement/SSC forces would eliminate the frequent RC tailoring and training challenges by adding these high-demand CS and CSS forces to the active Army.

Engagement Force: Organized, Trained and Ready

A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper examined four options for restructuring or expanding the active Army to improve its ability to conduct peace operations while staying ready for conventional war (see table).

Option IV increases the active Army by 20,000 and creates four brigades and three standing headquarters designed specifically for peace operations.[26] If this option were selected, it would certainly alleviate much of the SSC burden from the existing active Army force structure. However, even this contingency force would require augmentation during heavy SSC activity. With an average of 8,500 soldiers deployed since 1990, a force of 20,000 would provide a rotation base of almost 2.5 to 1, which is less than the Army's preferred 3 to 1 ratio.[27]

Option IV would clearly improve the Army's ability to conduct SSCs, but more important, it would increase the Army's capability and readiness for conventional war. However, this option would add significant costs to the defense budget, and SSC forces would be subject to a high rate of deployment.[28] Option II creates a separate SSC force, but the four brigades come from the existing active Army force structure.

An engagement force (EFOR) is a solution to the readiness dilemma. EFOR would be a corps-size force designed and focused solely on SSC operations, particularly OOTW. EFOR headquarters' primary functions would include training and evaluation, command and control and doctrine development.

EFOR would become the Army's proponent for SSC operations and the repository for SSC lessons learned and TTPs. It would establish a school, run by an experienced cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers, that would focus exclusively on mastery of SSC missions and tasks. Primarily a force-providing headquarters, EFOR would devote its full attention to preparing subordinate units for SSC missions through oversight, training and evaluation. EFOR would be subordinate to Forces Command and once committed, its deployed task forces would be attached to a regional commander in chief or subordinate joint task force for the duration of the SSC mission.

EFOR would command two specially organized infantry divisions that would perform many of the same functions as EFOR, albeit at a lower level. Organized specifically for SSC operations, the two divisions would each command three infantry brigades, an MP brigade, engineer brigade, aviation brigade, division support command, tank battalion, signal battalion, military intelligence battalion, civil affairs company and PSYOP company. The divisions would not require organic division artillery, a divisional cavalry squadron or an air defense battalion.

The centerpiece unit would be the infantry brigade, which would look essentially like the prototype interim brigade combat team (IBCT) and would form the base element of the deploying task force. The IBCT would receive augmentation from division troops based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time and civil (METT-TC) considerations and would deploy as a tailored brigade task force. Because of the decentralized, complex and politically sensitive nature of most SSC operations, brigadier generals would command each of the three IBCTs. The IBCT would become the force of choice for US participation in

Four Illustrative Approaches to Improve the Army's Conduct of Peace Operations

Approach	Changes	Costs or Savings (Millions of 1999 $)	
		One-time	Recurring
Option I: Cycle the Readiness of Some Active Army Units	Select three existing active Army brigades; cycle each through high state of alert every six months; rely on alert brigade to carry out peace operations.	na	-2
Option II: Reorganize Existing Active Army Forces for Peace Operations	Designate four existing brigades to carry out peace operations, and create three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 720 to 900.)	30	90
Option III: Convert Some Combat Units in the Active Army into Support Units	Convert one active-duty heavy division into support units.	940	-60 to -210
Option IV: Add Forces to the Active Army for Peace Operations	Create four brigades designed to carry out peace operations and three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 20,000.)	na	1,900

unilateral, bilateral and multilateral SSC operations.

With the capability for six brigade task forces, EFOR would be able to sustain one or two simultaneous SSC operations indefinitely and three or more for shorter duration. Ideally, EFOR could employ the 3 to 1 concept within each division–with one brigade executing, one preparing for and one recovering from an SSC operation. This would also minimize deployment frequency and allow for sustainment training at home station. Uncommitted EFOR elements could also be used by warfighting CINCs to execute theater engagement plans (TEPs).

It is important to emphasize that EFOR units would still maintain their warrior spirit and capability to execute small-unit combat operations. However, the emphasis on large-scale combat operations would be reduced to allow for more training on mission essential noncombat tasks. EFOR headquarters elements would become experts in civil-military, multinational and information operations. Each subordinate headquarters belonging to EFOR would devote full attention to studying doctrine and TTPs and preparing for potential SSC operations. Personnel serving in those headquarters would become specialists in SSC operations. All required CS and CSS forces would be in the active Army and be organic to EFOR. Organized, trained and ready for small-scale contingencies, EFOR would be prepared to respond to any short-notice contingency in support of national security interests.

Who would want to join a peacekeeping force that is always deployed? EFOR would be manned by volunteers. Although it is true that EFOR units would deploy more frequently than the rest of the Army, volunteers should always exceed requirements. People will volunteer for EFOR to participate in real-world missions, and to receive the increased pay associated with hazardous duty, among other reasons. Clearly EFOR is not for everyone, but many would enjoy the challenges and sense of accomplishment associated with OOTW.

Option IV suggests an increase of 20,000 in the active Army to create four specialized brigades and three standing headquarters specifically designed and designated for peace operations.[29] EFOR would require nearly twice that amount to field the corps headquarters, school cadre and two divisions. Although there are a number of possible solutions to obtaining the required resources, I offer the following recommendation.

EFOR should be formed from a combination of new and existing units. The corps headquarters, school cadre and one of the infantry divisions should be created as new units from the increase in Army end strength by 20,000. The 10th MD(L) would round out EFOR. The division would require significant restructuring, but its extensive SSC experience would enable it to transition rapidly. This option would increase active divisions to 11, with two devoted to SSC missions and the remaining nine and RC forces to MTWs.

Could EFOR work within existing authorizations? It might work better than the Army's current strategy of sharing SSC missions across the board. If EFOR were to be formed entirely from existing units, then I Corps, the 10th MD(L) and the 25th Infantry Division would be the most likely candidates. This would still leave eight active divisions (six heavy, the 82d Airborne and the 101st Air Assault) and all RC forces for MTWs.

As Readiness Declines

The Army's MTW readiness posture continues to decline because of increased small-scale contingency requirements. Current strategy of rotating SSC missions across the Army is suspect; it not only sends novices to execute highly sensitive SSC missions, it disrupts the precarious conventional training cycle that enables combat units to sustain warfighting proficiency. These observations are becoming more and more obvious to O/Cs at the Army's combat training centers.

Unfortunately, the real readiness impact will not be clearly visible until the Army is faced with another war. We cannot afford to wait until then. With a more specialized approach, the Army can kill two birds with one stone by providing professionally trained forces for SSCs while maintaining the level of conventional readiness required to successfully execute the two-MTW strategy.

With a trained and ready EFOR, the Army will be better able to implement the nation's engagement strategy and respond to short-notice contingency operations, which could help solve the Army's current readiness dilemma. Its implementation will not be easy. It will require a change in our culture, support from Congress and acceptance from top to bottom. However, implementing EFOR would effect a more efficient Army that could truly achieve full-spectrum dominance. ***MR***

NOTES

1. GEN John M. Shalikashvili, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), 1997), 1.
2. The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1998), 1-2.
3. Shalikashvili, 1.
4. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 156.
5. William S. Cohen, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1997), 12-13.
6. Sean D. Naylor, "The Army IG Confirms Combat Training Woes," *Army Times* (15 February 1999), 20.
7. Naylor, "The NTC: Facing New Challenges," *Army Times* (6 July 1998), 19.
8. Ibid., 20.
9. Naylor, "The Army IG," 20.
10. US General Accounting Office (GAO), *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability* (Washington, DC: GAO, October 1995), 29.
11. Ibid., 28.
12. US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War* (Washington, DC: CBO), 9.
13. GAO, *Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies* (Washington, DC: GAO, May 1999), 54.
14. US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness* (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 1996), A7.
15. Ibid., 10.
16. Cohen, 12.
17. GAO, *Peace Operations*, 86.
18. Lawrence A. Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes," *Military Review* (July-August 1997), 55.
19. CBO, 7.
20. GAO, *Peace Operations*, 26.
21. Yates, 60.
22. GAO, *Peace Operations*, 6.
23. Ibid., 43.
24. CBO, 18.
25. Ibid., 18-19.
26. Ibid., xix, 59.
27. Ibid., 60.
28. Ibid., 61.
29. Ibid., xxi.

Colonel Timothy D. Cherry, US Army, is the TSM-Force XXF, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He received a B.A. from Florida State University, an M.A. from Webster University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and The Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental US, Germany and Bosnia.

Building the Reserve Objective Force

Colonel Gary C. Howard, US Army Reserve, and
Major Gregory K. Johnson, US Army Reserve

In his statement, "The future is no longer what it used to be," Elie Wiesel, Winner of the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, succinctly describes the state of the US Army over the last several years. The increase in regional conflicts after the end of the Cold War has radically changed the focus of the nation's defense forces. Although much of the objective force is still in the development phase, the US Army is rapidly evolving its legacy force into an objective force that can ensure future security.

The US Army Reserve (USAR) is also changing to ensure that it can fulfill its role. And, even though we do not know exactly what the future USAR will look like, there are specific features that the reserve objective force must have. Because it is a continuing process, we need not wait to incorporate some of these changes.

USAR Readiness

USAR readiness is a direct function of training and operations. A lack of ongoing, high-quality training does not translate simply into untrained reservists. In the end, it means no reservists. If they do not receive challenging training, they will simply quit. Thus, the reserve objective force must develop new ways to improve training and to support soldiers and units.

The US Armed Forces have recently undergone a quiet revolution that makes Reserve Components (RC) ever more critical. More than half of the Army's total strength and nearly two-thirds of its combat service support (CSS) capability—medical, supply, maintenance and transportation—come from USAR and the Army National Guard (USNG) units. The USAR is particularly heavily invested in CSS. In fact, the Army can no longer conduct normal operations, let alone go to war, without the USAR.

Training Soldiers

New demands have changed the meaning of being in the USAR. The old formula—two weeks of annual training and one weekend per month—is not sufficient to ensure adequate readiness. Aggressive mission-focused training must be conducted throughout the year at every drill weekend. Annual training must focus on real-world support missions and integrated multi-echelon exercises.

The first requirement for high-quality inactive duty training is to have an adequate concentration of soldiers, units and equipment. This is often difficult in an RC that is geographically disbursed. To remedy this, we propose that the Army establish a series of facilities called Army training sites (ATSs), which would position a critical mass of units, soldiers and equipment at regional branch-specific training facilities. ATSs could leverage other local resources, such as large population centers for recruiting and proximity to like units from other services and natural features with which to enhance training and readiness. Collocating functionally related units would enhance the effectiveness of distance learning and communication with doctrine schools. ATSs would also provide a valuable training site for Active Components (AC) and a means to promote joint training for AC and RC soldiers. Integrating AC soldiers into RC training would greatly enhance the quality of training for both.

Of particular concern is the lack of intensive, high-quality collective training needed by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Although the Army school system does a great job training individual soldiers, it must improve the competence and experience of officers and NCOs so they can work successfully at battalion, brigade and division levels. Intensive, year-round training in operations and operational planning must be targeted to key collective training events. Planning and preparing for these events would be accomplished by aggressive collective staff training during weekend drills. This work would combine the Army's deliberate planning process with periodic command post exercises, field training exercises and other drills at the home station or ATS.

The Army currently suffers from a lack of collective-training opportunities to exercise units at the correct doctrine level. Few operations exist for even a battalion-level headquarters, and in those few, training benefits are often eroded by the philosophy that the soldiers will "get the idea." Unfortunately, they might not get the right one.

Computer simulations offer one cost-effective solution for training. Simulations are rapidly becoming more realistic and bring units and soldiers closer in a virtual world. However, all headquarters need to periodically experience operations using real equipment. The USAR needs to develop new exercises and conduct an overall review to ensure that funded exercises still provide adequate training at all levels.

Some of the best training that reservists get is with their AC counterparts. Outstanding opportunities based on real-world missions often come with AC planning windows of from 90 to 120 day. However, this limitation often runs afoul of the longer USAR planning and budgeting cycle, and many RC units must forego good training.

Supporting Soldiers

To make high-quality training a reality in the objective force, soldiers and units must be well supported. The administrative burden on most USAR commanders, particularly company commanders, is enormous and seriously detracts from their ability to conduct training. Any assistance—more full-time staff or better automated systems—would conserve scarce resources, eliminate training distracters and free commanders to focus on readiness and training.

Soldiers also need some direct support. Many RC soldiers are now provided housing during drill

weekends, and many reserve centers provide quarters to soldiers at little or no cost. This benefit has contributed to retention and morale, especially for younger soldiers.

Another place where investment bears large dividends is in travel expenses. Many soldiers travel long distances to drill sites, and concentrating resources at ATSs will increase these numbers. Mitigating travel costs is essential to the entire proposal. Restoring the ability to deduct travel expenses from federal income taxes would be a good first step. Some direct reimbursement for travel expenses is the logical step beyond tax relief. Housing and travel costs would be offset by gains in recruiting and training, particularly for highly skilled soldiers such as medical professionals.

USAR readiness can be immediately improved on another level as well. The USAR includes several of the Army's most senior functional headquarters, such as the 143d Transportation Command, the 412th Engineering Command, the 311th Corps and the Support Command. Commanding generals of these organizations depend on officers and senior NCOs who live nearby or who can pay their own way to man their staffs. The Army needs the best staff officers regardless of commuting distance or their ability to pay their own travel expenses.

The objective force will also have to redefine the relationship between reservists and their families and employers. The old formula of one weekend per month and two weeks each year has been replaced—many reservists routinely spend far more time than that. Family and career pressures are rapidly reducing the number of soldiers willing to participate. As a result, readiness suffers.

Army Training Site–Transportation

On 2 December 2000, the USAR formally dedicated the Mare Island Army Reserve Center at Vallejo, California. The center incorporates several of the characteristics of the vision of the reserve object force and is a prototype of an ATS–Transportation. The Transportation School selected Mare Island to be its West Coast instructional facility for watercraft military occupation specialties and is locating the Army's second state-of-the-art watercraft bridge simulator there. The concentration of soldiers, equipment and other resources will result in outstanding training synergies to support individual and collective training.

Initially, this unique training facility will be home to eight units, over 700 reservists and 45 full-time employees, all focusing on various aspects of transportation, including port operations and construction, cargo transfer and watercraft.

The center will provide soldiers proximity to outstanding training opportunities in real-world missions conducted at the Military Ocean Terminal; Concord, which is the Army's West Coast ammunition port; the Port of Oakland, which is a major port of embarkation during mobilizations; and San Francisco. The Bay Area also includes a substantial number of transportation-related units and facilities in the other services, access to the Maritime Administration reserve fleet, world-class harbors and the nation's fifth largest metropolitan area.

The Mare Island Center has also taken significant steps to support soldiers. Billeting is available at no cost. A combined personnel and administrative center relieves commanders of a substantial portion of nonmission-focused administrative responsibilities. Similarly, some supply functions have been centralized. A provisional holding company oversees in-processing and trains pre-initial active duty for training (IADT) soldiers in basic soldier orientation. The company serves as the primary interface with recruiting command and school brigades and ensures the publication of timely and accurate orders. These strategies conserve scarce resources and eliminate training distracters. Commanders are freed to focus on readiness and training.

We Must Change and Adapt

As the Army continues to adapt to the world situation, the USAR will also change. Some of the critical elements of the reserve objective force can be identified and implemented now as part of a reserve intermediate force, but we will need to think outside the box to ensure that USAR training and support will be adequate to prepare units for critical roles in the nation's defense. ***MR***

Colonel Gary C. Howard, US Army Reserve, is the assistant chief of staff, Support Operations, 311th Support Command (Corps), Los Angeles. He received a Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in the US Army Reserve in California, including deputy brigade commander; battalion commander; company commander; headquarters commandant and inspector general of a US Army Garrison; and executive officer of a transportation battalion.

Major Gregory K. Johnson, US Army Reserve, is an inspector general, 63d Regional Support Command, Los Alamitos. He received an M.B.A. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in the US Army Reserve in Pennsylvania and California.

MR Review Essay

The Mystery of Capital

LTC Geoffrey Demarest, US Army, Retired

Those who want to keep up with trends in foreign economic development theory, but do not know where to begin, should read Hernando De Soto's *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (Perseus Books Group, New York, 2000).

De Soto says, "Leaders of the Third World and former communist nations need not wander the world's foreign ministries and international financial institutions seeking their fortune. In the midst of their own poorest neighborhoods and shantytowns, there are trillions of dollars ready to be put to use if only the mystery of how assets are transformed into capital can be unraveled." De Soto's arguments, which are sound, clearly presented and backed by diligent, extensive primary research, extend the free-market theory he first outlines in *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World* (Harper & Row, New York, 1989), which gained him international recognition.

Capital . . .

De Soto and his team of researchers documented exhaustively the fact that for the poor to advance materially they must be able to create capital. And, in most developing countries they cannot. One result can be violent class confrontation. De Soto says, "Class confrontations in this day and age? Didn't that concept come down with the Berlin Wall? Unfortunately, it did not. What the West calls 'the underclass' is [elsewhere] the majority. And in the past, when their rising expectations were not met, that mass of angry poor brought apparently solid elites to their knees (as in Iran, Venezuela and Indonesia). In most countries outside the West, governments depend on strong intelligence services, and their elites live behind fortress-like walls for good reason."

As Property . . .

The reason for an inability to create capital—with consequent class warfare—can in part be found in a lack of formalized property regimes, which in advanced economies survey, record, protect and represent property rights. According to De Soto, "In the West . . . every parcel of land, every building, every piece of equipment or store of inventories is represented in a property document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden process that connects all these assets to the rest of the economy." Because this formalized property culture does not exist for the masses of the world's productive poor people, "most people's resources are commercially and financially invisible. Nobody really knows who owns what or where, who is accountable for the performance of obligations, who is responsible for loses and fraud, or what mechanisms are available to enforce for services and goods delivered." The upshot of a failure to create precise, reliable documentation of property rights, property courts, title insurance, brokerage laws and so on, is a world of "dead" capital. Assets might be literally and measurably in trillions of dollars, but they cannot attract investment.

Equals Prosperity

De Soto does not offer a magic formula, but it is refreshing to read a book on international economic theory without the eyes growing heavy and without suffering tired recommendations about forgiving debts or teaching peasants how to grow more catfish and chick peas. Yet, his book is more than a creative excursion into the dry realm of international developmental theory. His perspective is a powerful, unavoidable challenge to any developmental strategy or project that does not embrace the question of broad-based capital formation.

Why place this book on your military professional reading shelf? For one thing, identifying, mapping, documenting and arbitrating property interests will become a mandatory function of stewardship in places where constabulary interventions occur. Parallel works, such as John P. Powelson's *The Story of Land: A World History of Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform* (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, 1988), highlight the correlation between civil violence and informality in systems of property ownership. Property, as a theme within the study of violence and conflict resolution, is on the ascent; the linkage between unprotected property rights and violated human rights is being reasserted everywhere.

De Soto's book provides efficient insight into the relationship of material progress, property and human rights in many failing lands. It includes a matured set of specific actions for enlivening dead capital and establishing the legal and administrative framework for mass economic success. ***MR***

Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey B. Demarest, US Army, Retired, is a Latin America Analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the University of Colorado at Boulder, a J.D. from Denver University School of Law, an M.A. and Ph.D. from Denver University Graduate School of International Studies and is a graduate of the School of the Americas Command and General Staff College. His article "Cuba's Transition" appeared in the May-June 2001 edition of Military Review.

MR From My Bookshelf

Lions Led by Donkeys? Haig's Command Reappraised

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson, US Army

In the past 20 years there has been a revival of interest in World War I, which has resulted in a significant revision in the understanding of how the war on the Western Front was fought. Through most of the last century, the view of the fighting in Belgium and France was one of futility and stagnation. In the 1980s, historians Shelford Bidwell, Tim Travers and John Terraine prodded us toward a different view, asking that we consider the time from 1914 to 1918 as a period of impressive innovation.[1] The interpretative wave they launched reached high tide recently with Williamson Murray's bold assertion that World War I is *the* "Revolution in Military Affairs" of the 20th century.[2]

The renewed interest in the Great War is accompanied by an effort to rehabilitate the much-maligned men who led the armies on the Western Front. For years historians have looked on senior World War I leaders as "chateau" generals, who hid in the rear while their blunders caused thousands of soldiers to die amid mud, blood and barbed wire.

Against the persistent perception of armies being "lions led by donkeys," recent scholarship increasingly reveals that many World War I officers worked doggedly, often creatively, to overcome the tactical problems that had led to stalemate and trench warfare.

The German officer corps of 1914-1918 has been the chief beneficiary of this rehabilitation. US historians Tim Lupfer, Bruce Gudmundsson and David Zabecki emphasize the role of military culture in encouraging tactical innovation and adaptation in the Kaiser's army.[3] However, as these historians celebrate Teutonic military excellence, they cast the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) into the role of foil and victim. This is explicitly the case in Martin Samuels' *Command or Control, Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918*.[4] Samuels makes the BEF look hapless in comparison with the efficient Germans. Travers blames a flawed military culture for much of the suffering and frustration endured by the British army on the Western Front.

A reaction was inevitable. Led by British scholars, a number of historians have counterattacked the perception of flawed leadership and institutional ineptitude within the British army. Three books representative of the concerted effort to reevaluate the BEF's tarnished image are *Amiens to Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign,* by J.P. Harris with Niall Barr; *Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On,* edited by Brian Bond and Nigel Cave; and *Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I,* by Albert Palazzo.[5]

Harris and Barr's book is a straightforward campaign narrative that covers the British Army's greatest victory, the Hundred Days' Campaign of late 1918. Bond and Cave's collection of essays provides readers a fresh look at Haig—the much-maligned general who led the BEF through most of the war. Palazzo's book is the most provocative. He cites the BEF's development of chemical warfare as evidence that the British army's professional ethos made it a true "learning organization"—to use the current, trendy phrase.

Although drawn to the BEF's bloody history in the Meuse-Argonne, US readers often overlook the powerful blows the British Empire dealt the Germans during the last months of the war. Harris and Barr remind us that, although the BEF of late 1918 was the smallest of the major armies on the Western Front, it captured more Germans in the last months of the war than the US or French combined. Indeed, the BEF's role in the final Allied offensive was "predominant." Harris and Barr compellingly support this assertion. From the German army's "Black Day" in August to the general pursuit into Belgium in early November, the British kept constant, brutal pressure on their enemy, driving the Germans into exhausted despair.

In achieving these final victories, the BEF revealed itself to be the world's most technologically advanced army. British industry provided the BEF with lavish quantities of tanks, planes and machine guns, but it was in their prodigious and sophisticated use of artillery that British and Dominion troops showed mastery of the modern battlefield—30 to 40 percent of BEF troops were gunners.

By the end of the war, the British could predict scientifically and accurately how many guns and tons of shell per yard of front were needed to ensure that attacking infantry could penetrate enemy positions. The BEF's methodical use of artillery made their final advance nearly inexorable. Along with the BEF's overwhelming expenditure of materiel, the superlative fighting qualities of Australian and Canadian troops were especially key. Through August and September, Dominion forces repeatedly spearheaded British attacks.

Haig's Leadership

Not least in ensuring British success was the determined leadership of Field Marshal Douglas Haig. Though he would underestimate the rot in German morale at the end of

the war, Haig's steadiness and determination were essential elements in creating the final victory.

Bond and Cave's collection of essays attempts a similar positive evaluation of Haig. The essays suggest that although serious World War I students have sought a more balanced assessment of Haig that balance "has not percolated down to some of the most influential shapers of public opinion, for whom the simplistic myth of 'butchers and bunglers' . . . continues to exert an irresistible appeal."[6] The record needs to be righted, and the editors assembled the contributions of 14 historians who attended a 1998 conference on the subject held at the Imperial War Museum.

The essayists find much positive to say about Haig. John Hussey uses Haig's frequent visits to front-line headquarters in 1918 as powerful evidence against accusations of "chateau" generalship. According to Peter Simkins, by the end of the war Haig and his army commanders formed a competent, reliable partnership capable of effective communication up and down the chain of command. To Michael Crankshaw, Haig was a commander who, "contrary to caricature, possessed an openness of mind to technical innovation and the clarity of vision to concentrate on the applications which offered the best prospects of success."[7] Harris reinforces this point, arguing that Haig was quick to appreciate the tank's potential. Finally, in an unusual, provocative chapter, Cave finds Haig sustained by a Christian faith that the worldliness of the 21st century cannot appreciate.

The editors' desire to strike a balance may have fatally undermined their desire for a positive reappraisal of Haig, however. For example, essayist Gerard DeGroot finds Haig to be inarticulate, unimaginative and fixated on outdated cavalry tactics. Ian Beckett argues that like his predecessor, Haig was intellectually unprepared for the challenge of command on the Western Front. And, according to William Philpott, Haig's view of his French, Belgian and Portuguese allies was one of suspicion, prejudice and even contempt.

Haig's chief supporter in London was Sir William Robertson, yet essayist David Woodward shows that Haig was all too willing to abandon "Wully" when Robertson fell out of political favor. Perhaps most damning is Keith Grieves assessment of Haig's relationship with Lloyd George. Grieves argues that Haig neither understood why it was necessary to balance the manpower needs of the Western Front with those of Britain's industry nor comprehended the need to maintain public support.

One admires Bond and Cave's willingness to present Haig for reassessment, warts and all. The warts are conspicuous, and we must ultimately judge Haig damned by the faintness of the praise found in the collection.

British Army Ethos

Haig was the product of a British military culture that Travers sees as being incapable of readily adapting to the challenges of modern war. Palazzo attacks this interpretation. Although the subtitle of his book, *Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War II,* speaks of Britain's development of gas warfare, Palazzo's objective goes beyond that. By showing how the BEF integrated chemical warfare into its battlefield techniques, he highlights a professional ethos within the British army that give it the institutional adaptability to overcome a capable enemy to triumph on the Western Front.

Palazzo's examination of British use of gas warfare does, indeed, show an army that innovated and adapted. After a false start at Loos, the British continuously refined the use of gas as an important auxiliary to more traditional arms. By 1917, British industry provided a quantity of chemical shell that enabled the British to use gas over wide areas of the front for the purpose of producing casualties, reducing enemy morale and degrading the effectiveness of enemy artillery. Up to 50 percent of the shells used in 1918 were chemical rounds. Had the war gone longer, Palazzo believes British chemical use would have brought disaster to the German army.

Palazzo also argues that British use of chemical weapons was integrated into a broader, prewar British concept of how battles would be fought. In staff college training, British officers were taught that battles would typically have four phases: making contact, fixing the enemy and developing fire superiority, conducting the assault and continuing the pursuit. According to Palazzo, the entire four-year campaign on the Western Front could be packed into this phased development, with only the final phase missing. And, while gas warfare had not been envisioned before the war, British army ethos enabled them to integrate it into the middle two phases.

Many military readers will have trouble with these last aspects of Palazzo's argument. We are asked to believe that Phase 3 of battle, an event of hours in British staff college problems, actually lasted for two years. In his effort to ascribe method to the BEF's struggle to adapt, Palazzo seems to conflate what we now consider to be levels of war—the tactical and the operational. Beyond this, he asks readers to believe that British army ethos supported the integration of technological solutions into its battle concept.

Palazzo defines ethos as "the characteristic spirit and the prevalent sentiment, taste, or opinion . . . that provides the system through which an army interprets the problem of combat and tests the feasibility of solutions."[8] British army ethos was based on courage, honor and an attitude dismissive of professionalism. These attributes, Palazzo writes, enabled the BEF to prevail without doctrine. Lacking doctrine, the British military ethos led them to incorporate gas warfare into a prewar combat concept rather than developing a new way to look at war.

Palazzo asks too much of the reader. In 1918, the British clearly had the world's most technologically advanced army. However, to credit British prewar military culture with eventual success is to ask us to do a mental vault over disasters like the Somme, Passchendaele, Kut and Gallipoli in order to land on the Hundred Days. It cannot be done. The British military ethos must answer for the earlier tragedies before it can take credit for the eventual triumph. Nevertheless, by emphasizing the

creative ways the British army used gas warfare, Palazzo helps remedy the imbalance of credit given to German tactical innovation during World War I.

The authors ask us to reevaluate the "lions led by donkeys" stereotype. They attempt, at least in part, to answer the argument Travers and others make that British military culture proved a formidable handicap to the BEF. The recent emphasis on German battlefield prowess should not overshadow the tactical sophistication the British achieved by the end of war or keep us from remembering who ultimately won. Taken as a whole, these books might not quite convince us that the BEF was a model of flexible adaptation. However, they compel us to reconsider the achievements of the officers and men of the British Empire's greatest army. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Fire Power: British Army Weapons and Theories, 1904-1945* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987) and *How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army, 1917-1918* (London: Routledge, 1992); John Terraine, *The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War, 1861-1945* (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1980) and *White Heat: the New Warfare, 1914-1918* (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1982).
2. Williamson Murray, "Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1997), 69-79.
3. Tim Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 1981); Bruce Gudmundsson, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989); David Zabecki, *Steel Wind: Colonel George Bruchmueller and the Birth of Modern Artillery* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
4. Martin Samuels, *Command or Control, Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918* (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1995).
5. JP Harris with Niall Barr, *Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign, 8 August-11 November, 1918* (London: Brassey's, 1998); Brian Bond and Nigel Cave, ed., *Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On* (Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 1999); Albert Palazzo, *Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2000).
6. For a representative sample of that school of thought, see John Laffin, *British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One* (Great Britain: Sutton Publishing, 1988, reprinted 1997) and Denis Winter, *Haig's Command: A Reassessment* (London: Viking, 1991). Winter claims Haig looted the archival records in order to cover his most notorious blunders.
7. Michael Crankshaw, "The Impact of Technology on the BEF and its Commander," in Bond and Cave, 156.
8. Palazzo, 9-10.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson is a military history instructor at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. from Syracuse University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental US and Germany.

MR Book Reviews

EMBRACING DEFEAT: Japan in the Wake of World War II, John W. Dower, W.W. Norton & Co., The New Press, NY, 1999, 676 pages, $29.95.

Nominated for the 1999 National Book Award for Nonfiction, *Embracing Defeat* illuminates obscure aspects of Japan's occupation after World War II. John W. Dower has written several books about the period but has avoided repeating, in detail, political and social themes. American works about the occupation usually show how American ideas and methods reshaped Japanese society. Japanese works show how those ideas and methods were modified.

Dower has no patience with the view that the United States, personified by US General Douglas MacArthur, bestowed democracy on a grateful Japan, causing it to live happily ever after. In fact, Dower devotes much space to discussing the occupation government's conceits.

Dower adopts a critical view, skewering absurdities and pretensions, such as censorship regulations. For example, it was forbidden to criticize the Soviet Union during the Cold War's early days because it was one of the Allies that had participated in Japan's defeat. In fact, it was illegal to even mention censorship's existence.

By examining what people read, heard and saw, Dower recreates a specific historic moment, showing



how the occupation affected ordinary urban Japanese during that time of extreme poverty. Photographs enhance the story. They convey the depths of Japan's defeat and immediate postwar conditions more than mere words can say.

Bower also describes the tremendous outpouring of political and literary creativity that occurred during the occupation's early years. Not since the early years of Meiji, 75 years before, were so many political and social issues openly discussed from so many viewpoints.

Bower also devotes considerable space to the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, flawed by the amnesty given to the emperor; the consequences of the new constitution, which continue to reverberate; and the way occupation authorities systematically ignored the advice and counsel of prewar Japan experts.

Given the circumstances, the occupation was loaded with forthrightness, ambiguity, inconsistency, constancy, arrogance and humility. In short, it was human. And, while there might be much to deplore, there is also much to applaud. The occupation decisively changed Japanese society, and its influence is still felt.

Lewis Bernstein,
Assistant Command Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE AVOIDABLE WAR: Lord Cecil & Policy and Principle 1933-1935, J. Kenneth Brody, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1999, 389 pages, $24.95.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said, "One day [US] President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what [World

War II] should be called. I said at once 'The Unnecessary War.' There never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle."

In 1933, Great Britain and France, with the greatest military forces in the world, lacked the will—not the power—to enforce the Versailles Treaty. They could have prevented Nazi Germany's rearmament and subsequent political and military success. In *The Avoidable War,* J. Kenneth Brody offers insight into historical and diplomatic events that led to the war and shows how it could have been avoided.

Brody's premise is that German dictator Adolf Hitler could have been contained if it had not been for England's peace movement. Brody believes the Peace Ballot altered the global balance of power and played a critical role in the war's origins. The ballot, a public opinion poll, showed that the British people overwhelmingly supported disarmament over vital national interests. Brody provides strong evidence to indicate that the Peace Ballot's results drove Italian leader Benito Mussolini into Hitler's waiting arms, and the key to containing Nazi Germany was lost.

Readers can examine critical policy decisions and their second- and third-order effects. The book serves as a guide to the roles that morality and public opinion should and should not play in domestic and foreign policy decisions.

MAJ Patricia Jones, *USA,*
Fayetteville, North Carolina

DEATH GROUND: Today's American Infantry in Battle, Daniel P. Bolger, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1999, 359 pages, $29.95.

Daniel P. Bolger's latest book, *Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle,* is a superbly written account of the few soldiers who fight their enemy face-to-face in the most miserable of conditions.

Bolger examines the full spectrum of conflict, from noncombatant evacuation operations in Africa to the combined arms assault of an Iraqi strongpoint during the Gulf War. He covers operations between US Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy and the joint members of the Special Operations Forces. He includes combined operations with Saudi Arabians and the polyglot of UN forces in Somalia, expertly explaining the historical, strategic and tactical settings and friendly and enemy unit organizations.

In the page-turning manner of an action writer, Bolger details battles in Panama, Haiti, Africa, southwest Asia and Somalia. He gives credit where due to airborne troops, mechanized battalions, light infantry and Rangers and their strengths and weaknesses.

The book's importance lies in its explanation that when foreign policy is carried out by other means, the will



of the nation is imposed by a small percentage of US Armed Forces. Bolger reduces this fact to the logical conclusion: privates, sergeants and lieutenants literally shoulder the burden of national leaders' decisions. This is most clearly demonstrated in the rip-roaring chapter chronicling the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry's rescue of encircled Rangers and Special Forces troops in Mogadishu, Somalia. This action is the essence of the infantry gunfight, when men armed only with the weapons they carry close with the enemy. This is what I consider the missing chapter in Mark Bowden's gut-churning *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (Penguin Books, NY, 2000). The technology on which the nation predicated its Joint Vision is left on another continent; the battle is won by marksmanship, discipline, training and guts.

This book should be on every US soldier's reading list; however, it is not for the dilettante or the thin-skinned. Many of Bolger's criticisms are harsh and uncompromising.

MAJ Scott C. Farquhar, *USA,*
Hohenfels, Germany

WILSON'S CREEK: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1999, 408 pages, $37.50.

The battle of Wilson's Creek, which occurred early in the Civil War in southwest Missouri, is difficult to describe. The battle was actually two engagements fought simultaneously. A further complication is that Kansas and Missouri units fought on both sides of the Civil War and the battle, and at this early stage of the war, Union and Confederate soldiers wore blue as well as gray uniforms. Despite these inherent difficulties, William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III provide a readable account of this battle that resulted in a Union defeat and ensured that Missouri would be fought over for the next four years.

During their research, Piston and Hatcher unearthed a trove of original-source material to document backgrounds, ideals and motives that brought the two armies to Wilson's Creek. A reader learns about participants' hometowns and intimate relationships between military units and their communities. A consistent theme in soldiers' correspondence is honor—not letting their towns be embarrassed by either the unit's or the individual's performance in battle.

Much of the book is devoted to the sinews of war and the effects of logistics on warfare. Piston and Hatcher stress the difficulties of conducting operations in the face of shortages of food, water and forage. Compounding those difficulties was adverse weather—debilitating, stifling heat and dust. Equally important was the effect of terrain. The authors establish a clear relationship between terrain and unit performance.

The book's one shortcoming is its inadequate analysis of the battle's consequences for future operations. The battle should have been placed in the context of other Union and Confederate operations west of the

Mississippi River and how important it was to the political situation in Missouri in late 1861.

Piston and Hatcher have provided a service to Civil War historians by focusing on a significant battle in the Trans-Mississippi Theater—a region that has received significantly less attention than the East. They are commended for detailing the tactical battle and the soldiers who fought it.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, *USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE IRON WALL: Israel and the Arab World, Avi Shlaim, W.W. Norton & Company, NY, 2000, 608 pages, $32.50.

The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World details the development of Israel's relationship with its Arab neighbors in terms of a theory based on a 1923 book by Ze'ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky, *The Iron Wall: We and the Arabs* (out of print). Jabotinsky, one of the founders of the Revisionist Zionist movement, believed that peace with the Arabs and the resolution of the Palestinian question would only come about if based on an iron wall of Jewish military force. The wall would be a shield to guarantee Israel's coexistence with the Arab population within Palestine's colonial borders. Despite its defensive purpose, the wall could be viewed also as a sword to force the expansion of Israeli territory.

Avi Shlaim effectively builds what appears to be a unbiased case for an Israeli iron-wall policy. His meticulous research painstakingly rebuilds historical accounts of critical events in Israel's political development. He goes into depth on the Arab and Palestinian points of view as well as Israel's decisionmaking process.

Shlaim is careful not to deliver the typical pro-Israeli interpretation of events. He describes events through a more pragmatic perspective. However, in the last chapters his tone changes to open criticism of Israel's use of the iron wall as a tool of aggression to deny the Palestinian population self-determination. In his view, this is the single biggest reason for the failure of Middle East peace initiatives.

MAJ Carl Grebe, *USA, Jupiter, Florida*

EAGLES ON THEIR BUTTONS: A Black Infantry Regiment in the Civil War, Versalle F. Washington, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1999, 113 pages, $24.95.

Eagles on Their Buttons is the culmination of detailed research on the 5th US Colored Troop (USCT), which was raised in 1863 and fought during the last year and a half of the Civil War. Versalle Washington cites excellent source material regarding the regiment and its fight to become a full-fledged combat unit of the Union Army. However, his outstanding research is sometimes overridden by his lack of objectivity.

The 5th USCT was, at first, a state volunteer regiment of Ohio blacks and some whites. I am not sure that Washington gives a completely unbiased assessment of the obstacles these men faced. His logic appears to



be seriously flawed when he stereotypes Southerners as racists then gives excellent, detailed descriptions of how racist Northerners were as well.

There were many black soldiers in northern regiments who might have made fine officers. However, Northerners allowed only whites to be commissioned officers—a policy that lasted for years after the war. And, even after black officers were commissioned, they were posted to segregated black units and were not allowed to lead white troops. This benevolent racism was a manifestation of a deeper racism and the hypocrisy of Northerners who were willing to let black men serve in the military but certainly not lead it.

What Washington does do in terms of the historical record is provide a microcosm of black combatant participation on the Federal side. The problems these men faced and their devotion to duty is an excellent study in the dynamics of soldiers who carry the burden to prove themselves as citizen soldiers.

This book is a good addition to the understanding of the Civil War's social aspects. I hope that a companion study of black Confederate soldiers might complement this book.

LTC Edwin Kennedy Jr, *USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION: The Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army by the *Bundeswehr,* Frederick Zilian Jr., Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1999, 256 pages, $57.95.

Unification or reunification of a people, particularly those separated by diametrically opposed ideologies and histories, is not an easy process. Reconstruction in the United States was an unhappy period. German unification in 1871 was fraught with uncertainty. The reunification of France following the fall of the Vichy government was rocky. The forced reunification of Vietnam in 1975 was draconian. None of these events was accomplished smoothly. Reuniting militaries is an even thornier proposition. Most reuniting societies do not even attempt it.

Germany's reunification process has been relatively smooth, even while incorporating personnel of the former communist state's army into its military ranks. Ten percent of current *Bundeswehr* officers were originally commissioned in the *Nationale Volksarmee*. Furthermore, this incorporation occurred during an overall reduction in force, a major change in force structure and while supporting Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. It was an impressive accomplishment by an impressive army.

That Germany's reunification went so well is a compliment to the professionalism, planning and military-political trust between the *Bundeswehr* and the German government. Frederick Zilian Jr. discusses key decisions, the reasonably equitable process developed to handle the incorporation, its snags and glitches and the successes encountered

while uniting the forces. The book is an excellent companion to Dale R. Herspring's superb *Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the East German Military* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

Lester W. Grau,
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,



JOHN LAURENS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, Gregory D. Massey, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 2000, 327 pages, $34.95.

John Laurens was a native of South Carolina and son of Henry Laurens, president of the Continental Congress. *John Laurens and the American Revolution* poignantly details Laurens' life, which was filled with adversity as well as privilege.

Gregory D. Massey describes with great clarity, insight and brevity John Laurens' war service as General George Washington's aide-de-camp. Laurens was involved in almost all of the Revolutionary War battles and also participated in a diplomatic mission to France. The extent of his involvement is amazing, considering that he died at age 27.

Although the book is written for the general reader, its 72 pages of notes and bibliographical data are valuable for historians.

LTC Glenn E. Gutting, *USAR, Fayetteville, Arkansas*

TALIBAN: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2000, 274 pages, $27.50.

Ahmed Rashid spent over two decades as a journalist in Pakistan and Afghanistan for Britain's *Daily Telegraph* and *Far Eastern Economic Review.* The subjects of his reports include the Soviet's intervention in and withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan and the clashes between ethnic groups that followed Russia's fight for control of strategic routes in Afghanistan.

Rashid shows how religious radicalism entered Afghanistan during the Soviet war in that nation (1979-1989). Along with providing arms during the war, Saudi Arabia began a deliberate policy of exporting its brand of Islam known as *Wahabism*.

Pakistan also played a pivotal role as millions of Afghan refugees streamed across the border. Unemployment, desperation and a lack of opportunity for education provided fertile fields for thousands of *Madrassahs*, who preached radicalism.



Their doctrine attracted Afghans and poor Pakistanis and Arabs and contributed to the collapse of Pakistan's educational system. The students, or *Talibs*, from which the word *Taliban* originates, represent the 50,000 students who formed the bulk of the organization's leadership and fighting force.

After the Soviets left Afghanistan, ethnic clans continued fighting one another and the communist Afghans. In a United Nations-brokered plan that guaranteed security for President Najibullah, the Pashtun Gilbuddin Hikmetyar claimed victory. Even so, the Afghans continued to fight, and lawlessness prevailed.

Dozens of *Talibs* began organizing a Robin Hood-type organization, righting wrongs committed by former warlords. Their brand of Islamic radicalism and the subsequent murder of Najibullah offended many Afghans. Women, who from the time of the prophet Muhammed had traded, rode horses and exercised many freedoms, were not allowed to leave their homes. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan observed that 50,000 armed thugs held millions of Afghan citizens hostage. In controlled areas, the Taliban declared the Shiite's beliefs heresy and conducted ethnic genocide.

Other subjects Rashid discusses in *Taliban* are the spread of religious fanaticism in Central Asia, the intrigue of big business vying for access to Central Asian gas and petroleum reserves, and the drug trade, whose lucrative operations involve truck convoys that transit Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The appendix includes extraordinary organizational charts and a quick chronology. Because of the continued unrest in the region, I highly recommend this book as an introduction to what future intervention forces might face.

LT Youssef Aboul-Enein, *MSC, USN, Fort Sheridan, Illinois*

Editor's note: Aboul-Enein is the great-nephew of Sibghatullah El-Mujaddidi, who was interim president of Afghanistan after the defeat of Soviet forces and who was forced out by Islamic radicals. Seventy-nine members of the Mujaddidi family were killed by the communists.

TO HELL WITH HONOR: Custer and the Little Bighorn, Larry Sklenar, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2000, 416 pages, $29.95.

Few events in US history have generated more interest or more controversy than the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Except for the Battle of Gettysburg during the Civil War, more books and articles have been written about the Little Bighorn than any other battle in US history.

Larry Sklenar makes no bones about where he stands on the Custer controversy: he believes Custer's battle plan was actually far different from any advanced by scholars thus far. He says, "Custer made decisions in accordance with army regulations and his best instincts as an experienced commander. . . . [H]is logistical tail (mule train) was a major

impediment, [and] certain subordinates could not surmount the limits of their personalities in a desperate situation and so contributed to the failure of the mission. . . . Custer made a totally unselfish commitment to save the bulk of his regiment by taking his wing into a diversionary posture in full expectation that the surviving elements of the Seventh would rally to his aid." Sklenar does not claim his argument is new. His is essentially the thesis Libby Bacon Custer propagated long after the disaster.

Some readers will find Sklenar's interpretations convincing; others will reject his argument completely; still others will quibble over the accuracy of some of his details. Therefore, I recommend *To Hell with Honor* only to Custer devotees who have a substantial knowledge of the 1876 campaign and Custer literature.

Jerold E. Brown, ***Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

WHAT THEY DIDN'T TEACH YOU ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, Mike Wright, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1999, 343 pages, $19.96.

There is an American History class going on now at Alma-Mater School in Anywhere, USA. The students will spend a week on the American Revolution. During that week they will learn that George Washington commanded the American Forces; Paul Revere knew how to ride and make a lot of noise; the Army spent a cold winter at Valley Forge; the Army spent one Christmas Eve attacking the British somewhere; Betsy Ross might have or might not have made the first flag; and the war ended at Yorktown.

These facts summarize what the kids will remember, but history must be more than names, dates and places. Revolution was caused by and happened to people. What did they do? How did they feel? Who else was involved? Why was that location chosen? What happened next? Why?

Along comes Mike Wright. His book is full of little-known facts that enhance the basics. His material's scope ranges from the soldiers' average height, to the password used at the Battle of Yorktown, to how German-born General Friedrick von Steuben drilled soldiers when he could not speak English. Some might argue that this level of detail is too far down into the weeds. Not so! The facts and stories present realistic and human facets to a defining era of US history. They are also seeds planted in the imagination to produce the fruit of curiosity.

This interesting book is easy to read, at times amusing and always illuminating. My understanding of this period increased as Wright corrected misconceptions and added insight. I heartily recommend this book, and I look forward to reading Wright's other books.

MAJ William T Bohne, ***USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas***

THE MEN OF SECESSION AND CIVIL WAR, James L. Abrahamson, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE, 2000, 177 pages, $17.95.

Retired Army officer James L. Abrahamson, in *Men of Secession and Civil War,* writes on the events, men and ideas leading to the secession crisis. He admirably lays out the ends and means of southern radicals or "fire-eaters." Yet, he generally fails to do the same for their northern counterparts—the radical Republicans. The only northern radical mentioned is John Brown, whose abortive attempt to begin a slave rebellion at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, in 1859 lent credence to southern radicals' propaganda that northern abolitionists wanted to help slaves wipe out white southerners.

Southern radicals are treated in more depth. The Dred Scott decision fed northern propaganda that the "Slave Power" faction sought to ensure that slavery would become the law of the land. Brown's raid and the Dred Scott decision made a moderate position on slavery less tenable.

Abrahamson thoroughly exposes the southern radicals' motives and methods, especially the 1860 Democratic Party Convention debacle. In an effort to destroy the party, the fire-eaters attempted to bring about secession by pushing the Democratic Party platform to extremes.

Overall the book is a case study in what can happen in domestic politics if extremists at either end of the political spectrum demonize their political opponents, question their motives and make moderation more difficult. If a reader desires a somewhat scholarly but partisan rendition of the secession crisis from a northern perspective, this book will suffice. Those looking for an equal, although partisan, pro-southern perspective, should read Charles Adams' *When in the Course of Human Events* (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2000).

MAJ D. Jonathan White, ***USA, Smithfield, Virginia***

COMPANY AYTCH: Or, A Side Show of the Big Show, Sam Watkins, M. Thomas Inge, ed., Plume Books, New York, 1999, 249 pages, $13.95.

It is not possible to study the American Civil War without hearing of Sam Watkins' book *Company Aytch*. Ken Burns' seminal 1990 television series "The Civil War" makes numerous references to the book, and the *Time-Life* series *The Civil War* quotes from Watkins more than a dozen times. What makes this work so special? Watkins was a common Southern foot soldier. He was not a great leader, and his name is not prominently listed in official histories. His book is the remembrances of a young man who saw all of the glory and horror the Civil War offered.

Watkins did not begin his book until 15 years after the war. How much is fact, and how much is fiction? Certainly some of the dates and places are confused and inaccurate, but it does not necessarily follow that the stories he reports are inaccurate. The reader might question the lengthy discourses presented as word-for-word discussions, but there is no doubt the stories were real for Watkins. He is often overcome by the memories of which he is writing: "I cannot tell the facts as I desire to. In fact my hand trembles so, and my feelings are so overcome, that it is hard for me to write at all. But we went to the place that we were ordered to go to, and when we arrived there we found the guard sure enough—each and every one was as cold and as hard frozen as the icicles that hung from their beards and faces and clothing—dead!"

The reader should not expect an accurate history of the Civil War, but rather an accurate account of

what the war meant to Watkins. The book's strength lies in its character and prose. The reader will learn about life and death during the deadliest conflict fought on American soil and will enjoy doing so, for the book reads as smoothly and easily as a novel. It is rare for a book to live up to its hype; Watkins' does.

LTC David G. Rathgeber, *USMC, Quantico, Virginia*



THE DELAFIELD COMMISSION AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION, Matthew Moten, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2000, 270 pages, $47.95.

In 1855, nearly a year after British and French forces invaded the Crimean Peninsula on the Black Sea to beat back a Russian offensive aimed at crushing the Ottoman Empire, US Secretary of War Jefferson Davis sent a commission to observe the fighting and report on developments in military strategy. He selected three of the US Army's finest officers, all West Pointers, who had graduated near the top of their respective classes and received commissions in the Corps of Engineers—plum assignments for graduates before the American Civil War. Major Richard Delafield, Class of 1818 and former academy superintendent, led the three-man delegation that included Albert Mordecai, Class of 1823, and one of the Army's most promising young leaders, Captain George McClellan, Class of 1846.

Delafield, Mordecai and McClellan were the first group of officers officially dispatched by the United States to observe a war in progress. Their mission was highly publicized in military circles, and its outcome was awaited anxiously by Davis and hundreds of active-duty officers.

In *The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession,* Matthew Moten tells the story of how well the Commission did its job and why it failed in ways crucial to the development of US military strategy. His thesis, far from being confined to an analysis of the Commission's work, is broader. Moten argues persuasively that the Commission represented "a milepost in the history of American military professionalism." He contends that "the performance of the Delafield Commission furnishes a useful indicator of the maturity of professional thought in the 1850s—the state of the American military art."

The Commission spent more than a year gathering information, a good bit of socializing and considerable letter writing, detailing for family and professional acquaintances their experiences in dealing with the major combatants. They visited England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia before finally arriving in the Crimea—too late to witness major hostilities. However, what they did see allowed them to produce extensive reports that included discussions ranging far beyond battlefield operations.

The government published thousands of copies of the reports. They were distributed to civilians and the military and served as guides for learning how European powers were waging war. They provided blueprints for improving fortifications and armaments and sounded the warning to US politicians that England and France could, with little difficulty, turn their formidable military assets against the United States.

As a consequence of Moten's careful analysis and patient exploration of letters, official documents and scholarly sources, his book is more than simply another good historical study. Rather, it is the kind of book all professionals should read, and one that more professionals should write. Although Moten never says so himself—I suspect he is too modest to make this claim—his book shares some of the best qualities that the reports of Delafield, Mordecai and McClelland exhibit.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, *USA, Retired, Reading, Pennsylvania*

THE SOUL OF BATTLE: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny, Victor Davis Hanson, The Free Press, NY, 1999, 412 pages, $30.00.

Whether discussing the armies and the leadership styles of Epaminondas of Thebes or US Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and George S. Patton, Victor Davis Hanson tells one heck of a good story. Sure, there are lots of great tales about these particular generals and their respective campaigns against slave-holding societies—Sparta, the Confederacy and Nazi Germany, but few historians have told these stories with Hanson's verve.

Hanson is an outspoken advocate of his protagonists' actions: "It is a hard thing for contemporary liberalism to envision war as not always evil but as sometimes very necessary—and very necessarily brutal if great evil is to disappear." However, Hanson is so busy making strong statements that he incurs a nearly fatal case of hyperbolic historiography. For example, he states that "Free men . . . can make war brutally and lethally beyond the wildest nightmares of the brutal military culture they seek to destroy." Does this mean that Patton's 3d Army was more violent than Germany's *Waffen SS* or one of Russian dictator Josef Stalin's operational maneuver groups? Does this mean that Sherman's invasion of the Deep South was more ferocious than William Quantrill's forays into Kansas or Nathan Bedford Forrest's raids behind Union lines in Tennessee? Apparently yes, according to Hanson. Obviously not, according to the historical record.

Frankly, I was a bit confused about this book's subject. Was it how democracies fight wars, or was it how certain rather eccentric generals commanded soldiers who happened to be from democratic societies? I eventually concluded it was both. Indeed, at times Hanson seems to say that unless democracies have oddball individualists in command they will

be militarily inept if not impotent.

When comparing the typical US World War II general to Patton, Hanson asks, "Were there any [other army commanders who] could take raw troops, teach them to kill and then lead them against the most highly trained and deadly infantry in the history of warfare?" Yes, there were. Patton might have defeated the Germans, but he got "by with a little help from his friends"—Stalin's dictatorial Red Army on the eastern front and the US 1st, 7th and 9th armies on Patton's flanks.

Hanson is a rousing storyteller, but he is not prudent. But, then, neither were Epaminondas, Sherman or Patton.

Michael Pearlman, ***Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

THE CANADIAN FORCES: Hard Choices, Soft Power, Joseph T. Jockel, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Ontario, 1999, 132 pages, price unavailable.

In *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power,* Canadian defense analyst Joseph T. Jockel asks: "What is the role of the military, and how much is enough?" With the end of the Cold War, this is the question that faces democratic governments throughout the world. Canada's mission and funding dilemma provides a microcosmic view of issues that might have implications for all militaries.

Jockel's bottom line is the need for the Canadian government to revise current national military strategy. In Canada, as elsewhere, the end of the Cold War brought demands for a "peace dividend" that decreased military funding in favor of deficit paybacks and increased social spending. This was followed by massive force-structure cuts.

The strategic concept of "soft power" assumed that in the post-Cold War environment, the government would resolve conflicts through diplomatic persuasion rather than the use of military force. But, instead of a decreasing need for armed forces, operational tempos increased, and forces began to suffer the stresses of being too thin and operating under budget.

Jockel shows two factors that affect Canada's readiness—widespread equipment obsolescence and inadequate funding. These have almost destroyed the force's ability to execute the missions defined in a 1994 white paper:

- Protecting national sovereignty.
- Maintaining Canada-US defense cooperation.
- Contributing to international security.

Jockel argues effectively for maintaining these capabilities, both to meet Canada's moral obligation to cooperative North American defense and to maintain Canada's international stature and relevance. The key is deciding what enough is and providing adequate funding to make the strategy viable.

Although Jockel clearly shows his bias for increased defense spending to modernize the military, he also acknowledges that public and political support is lacking. The United States might also soon face this situation.

MAJ Bradley D. Bloom, ***USA, Fayetteville, North Carolina***